Together with my colleague Marina Uzunova, I wrote a handout on how to deal with the last stages of one's PhD, containing practical and 'psychological' tips. We wrote it for an early career meeting at the VU Amsterdam. As such, the handout is better suited for those pursuing a PhD in Europe (and the Netherlands specifically), though some of the things we say may apply more broadly. If you are curious, you can find it here.
I propose a novel view on hard choices. It broadens the concept to include not only ‘classic’ hard choices but also transformative and aspirational choices. I argue that a choice is hard when an individual does not have an all-things-considered reason to choose an option over another and the objects of choice are ultimate ends. Construing hard choices thusly supports and explains the widely held assumption that, when faced with hard choices, it is impermissible to choose arbitrarily. More specifically, it shows that it is impermissible to choose arbitrarily by plumping and, yet, legitimate to do so by picking. Understanding hard choices as I propose illuminates that there are moral and agential constraints that limit the space of permissible decision-making procedures when confronted with ‘classic’ hard, transformative, and aspirational choices. Delineating these constraints, in turn, can provide guidance to critically appraise current theories of practical rationality.
2023. Adaptive Preferences, Self-expression and Preference-based Freedom Rankings. Economics and Philosophy
If preference-based freedom rankings are based on all-things-considered preferences, they risk judging phenomena of adaptive preferences as freedom enhancing. As a remedy, it has been suggested to base preference-based freedom rankings on reasonable preferences. But this approach is also problematic. This article argues that the quest for a remedy is unnecessary. All-things-considered preferences retain information on whether the availability of an option contributes to the value that freedom has for a person’s self-expression. If preference-based freedom rankings use all-things-considered preferences to evaluate whether an option contributes to a person’s self-expression, they are immune to the problem posed by adaptive preferences.
Collective Action Problems, Self-defeating Behaviours, and their Alleged Equivalence: Myth or Reality? [draft available upon request]
In preparation for "The Ethics of Inefficacy" (under contract with Routledge)
It seems an intuitive – and prima facie compelling – assumption that collective action problems and self-defeating behaviours are relevantly alike. As such, it has been argued that solutions to one problem can be fruitfully applied to its intra- or interpersonal, analogue. In noticing that many solutions to one problem fail to transfer to the other, I suggest that the similar structure of collective action problems and self-destructive behaviors does not warrant that the two problems can be treated as relevantly alike. In fact, or so I argue, structural equivalence entails normative equivalence only if two conditions (control and non-waivability) are met. I propose a restatement of the equivalence between the two problems that accounts for this remark. My analysis has broader implications for understanding what factors determine that two problems are relevantly alike in a way that helps our normative theorizing.
How Pre-commitment Limits Autonomy [draft available upon request]
This article suggests that, contrary to what is comonly held, pre-commitment limits the autonomy of the weak-willed indivdual in an important way
Toilsome Achievements Meet Instrumental Rationality [draft available upon request]
This paper argues that theories of instrumental rationality are ill-equipped to deliver insights on a specific instantiation of vague ends.
This paper aims to show that the chaining argument offered by Ruth Chang to support the existence of parity is of no help in adjudicating the truth or falsity of the Trichotomy Thesis.
I don't have a polished draft of these manuscripts yet. I am, however, happy to think and talk about such topics (hopefully, some of these ideas will move to the above section soon).
Academic freedom and the asymmetry between private and public funding
Moral and rational lenses to analyse grit
The rational vices of being resolute
The problematic symmetry between statistical discrimination and affirmative action
Does Mandatory Mask-Wearing Restrict Individual freedom? Public Ethics
2024. Special Issue on Intra- and Interpersonal Dilemmas in Ethics and Rational Choice. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 17(1). (With Benjamin Mullins)
2024. The Challenge of Choosing Well. An interview with Chrisoula Andreou. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 17(1). (with Tessa Supèr).
2022. The Philosophy and Economics of Measuring Discrimination and Inequality. A Roundtable discussion with Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Xavier Ramos, and Dirk Van de gaer. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 15(1). (with Lennart Ackermans).
2021. Grounding Equal Freedom. An Interview with Ian Carter. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 14(2).
2019. Review of Ivan Moscati’s Measuring Utility: From the Marginal Revolution to Behavioral Economics. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 13(1): 93-101. (with Enrico Mattia Salonia)