Together with my colleague Marina Uzunova, I wrote a handout on how to deal with the last stages of one's PhD, containing practical and 'psychological' tips. We wrote it for an early career meeting at the VU Amsterdam. As such, the handout is better suited for those pursuing a PhD in Europe (and the Netherlands specifically), though some of the things we say may apply more broadly. If you are curious, you can find it here.
I propose a novel view on hard choices. It broadens the concept to include not only ‘classic’ hard choices but also transformative and aspirational choices. I argue that a choice is hard when an individual does not have an all-things-considered reason to choose an option over another and the objects of choice are ultimate ends. Construing hard choices thusly supports and explains the widely held assumption that, when faced with hard choices, it is impermissible to choose arbitrarily. More specifically, it shows that it is impermissible to choose arbitrarily by plumping and, yet, legitimate to do so by picking. Understanding hard choices as I propose illuminates that there are moral and agential constraints that limit the space of permissible decision-making procedures when confronted with ‘classic’ hard, transformative, and aspirational choices. Delineating these constraints, in turn, can provide guidance to critically appraise current theories of practical rationality.
2023. Adaptive Preferences, Self-expression and Preference-based Freedom Rankings. Economics and Philosophy
If preference-based freedom rankings are based on all-things-considered preferences, they risk judging phenomena of adaptive preferences as freedom enhancing. As a remedy, it has been suggested to base preference-based freedom rankings on reasonable preferences. But this approach is also problematic. This article argues that the quest for a remedy is unnecessary. All-things-considered preferences retain information on whether the availability of an option contributes to the value that freedom has for a person’s self-expression. If preference-based freedom rankings use all-things-considered preferences to evaluate whether an option contributes to a person’s self-expression, they are immune to the problem posed by adaptive preferences.
Collective Action Problems, Self-defeating Behaviours, and their Alleged Equivalence: Myth or Reality? [draft available upon request]
In preparation for "The Ethics of Inefficacy" (under contract with Routledge)
It seems an intuitive – and prima facie compelling – assumption that collective action problems and self-defeating behaviours are relevantly alike. As such, it has been argued that solutions to one problem can be fruitfully applied to its intra- or interpersonal, analogue. In noticing that many solutions to one problem fail to transfer to the other, I suggest that the similar structure of collective action problems and self-destructive behaviors does not warrant that the two problems can be treated as relevantly alike. In fact, or so I argue, structural equivalence entails normative equivalence only if two conditions (control and non-waivability) are met. I propose a restatement of the equivalence between the two problems that accounts for this remark. My analysis has broader implications for understanding what factors determine that two problems are relevantly alike in a way that helps our normative theorizing.
How Pre-commitment Limits Autonomy [draft available upon request]
Submitted
This article suggests that, contrary to what is comonly held, pre-commitment limits the autonomy of the weak-willed indivdual in an important way
Toilsome Achievements Meet Instrumental Rationality [draft available upon request]
Submitted
This paper argues that theories of instrumental rationality are ill-equipped to deliver insights on a specific instantiation of vague ends.
This paper aims to show that the chaining argument offered by Ruth Chang to support the existence of parity is of no help in adjudicating the truth or falsity of the Trichotomy Thesis.
Do we Owe Ourselves to Act against the Odds?
I aim to provide an analysis of the morality of acting against the odds through the lens of duties to the self. I argue that whether a person should act against the odds depends on the balance of duties of self-compassion and self-care. A person’s duties of self-care often speak against acting against the odds, when somebody could attain the same prudentially valuable outcome in an easier manner. A person’s duties of self-respect, instead, favour acting against the odds because of the deep link between performing difficult actions and respect for one’s worth. I advance the thesis that, because performing difficult actions is an excellent exercise of the will, intending to perform these actions displays respect towards one's worth as a rational agent. If my argument is correct, it adds an important layer to the moral analysis of acting against the odds, and it has downstream effects for neighbouring discussion in epistemology and consequentialism.
‘Acting against the odds’ is acting against one’s evidence that one will succeed. Most of the discussion on the rationality of acting against the odds has focused on whether believing against the odds is rational. In this paper, rather, we address the question of whether acting against the odds can be rational and, if so, under what conditions. First, we provide the first axiomatic characterisation of the preferences of an individual who acts against the odds. Second, we analyse the normative implications of having preferences so characterised. We understand an individual who acts against the odds as an individual who prefers having the agency of increasing the likelihood of attaining a good outcome, which would otherwise be low. To exemplify, an individual might choose to pursue a PhD because she prefers increasing the chances of attaining an academic job by exerting effort. She would not experience such agency while attempting to be successful in other, less risky, careers. Having this preference, we show, is inconsistent with other theories of behaviour under risk such as, prominently, expected utility theory. We thus analyse what behavioural properties a person who acts against the odds satisfy and we specify in which cases this behaviour counts as rational, and in which cases it does not.
If you Vote Green, How Come you Still Fly? In Defence of Apparent Hypocrisy
I argue that being committed to a societal goal does not require one to perform an individual action that is causally inefficacious (or morally negligible) in the absence of relevant institutions (i.e., policies or social norms) that coordinate the performance of the action. While commitment does not generate the requirement to perform causally inefficacious actions in the absence of coordination, it does generate the requirement to do so when such coordination is in place. This article aims to i) defend this apparent inconsistency and ii) argue against the view that integrity or instrumental rationality requires acting on one's commitments or values in the case of collective action problems (without explicit coordination).
Does Mandatory Mask-Wearing Restrict Individual freedom? Public Ethics
2024. Special Issue on Intra- and Interpersonal Dilemmas in Ethics and Rational Choice. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 17(1). (With Benjamin Mullins)
2024. The Challenge of Choosing Well. An interview with Chrisoula Andreou. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 17(1). (with Tessa Supèr).
2022. The Philosophy and Economics of Measuring Discrimination and Inequality. A Roundtable discussion with Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Xavier Ramos, and Dirk Van de gaer. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 15(1). (with Lennart Ackermans).
2021. Grounding Equal Freedom. An Interview with Ian Carter. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 14(2).
2019. Review of Ivan Moscati’s Measuring Utility: From the Marginal Revolution to Behavioral Economics. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 13(1): 93-101. (with Enrico Mattia Salonia)