Together with my colleague Marina Uzunova, I wrote a handout on how to deal with the last stages of one's PhD, containing practical and 'psychological' tips. We wrote it for an early career meeting at the VU Amsterdam. As such, the handout is better suited for those pursuing a PhD in Europe (and the Netherlands specifically), though some of the things we say may apply more broadly. If you are curious, you can find it here.
I propose a novel view on hard choices. It broadens the concept to include not only ‘classic’ hard choices but also transformative and aspirational choices. I argue that a choice is hard when an individual does not have an all-things-considered reason to choose an option over another and the objects of choice are ultimate ends. Construing hard choices thusly supports and explains the widely held assumption that, when faced with hard choices, it is impermissible to choose arbitrarily. More specifically, it shows that it is impermissible to choose arbitrarily by plumping and, yet, legitimate to do so by picking. Understanding hard choices as I propose illuminates that there are moral and agential constraints that limit the space of permissible decision-making procedures when confronted with ‘classic’ hard, transformative, and aspirational choices. Delineating these constraints, in turn, can provide guidance to critically appraise current theories of practical rationality.
2023. Adaptive Preferences, Self-expression and Preference-based Freedom Rankings. Economics and Philosophy
If preference-based freedom rankings are based on all-things-considered preferences, they risk judging phenomena of adaptive preferences as freedom enhancing. As a remedy, it has been suggested to base preference-based freedom rankings on reasonable preferences. But this approach is also problematic. This article argues that the quest for a remedy is unnecessary. All-things-considered preferences retain information on whether the availability of an option contributes to the value that freedom has for a person’s self-expression. If preference-based freedom rankings use all-things-considered preferences to evaluate whether an option contributes to a person’s self-expression, they are immune to the problem posed by adaptive preferences.
The Inefficacy Problem: The Emperor's New Clothes? [draft available upon request]
Contributed Chapter to "The Ethics of Inefficacy" (Routledge)
The inefficacy problem, it has been assumed, can be instantiated both at a collective level – through collective action problems – and at the individual level – via self-defeating behavior. This has led to the assumption that reasons to act in one domain can transfer to its intra- or interpersonal counterpart. In noticing that some solutions to one instantiation of the problem fail to transfer to the other, this chapter suggests that referring to the inefficacy problem may be less normatively instructive than what has been thought. The supposed structural equivalence between collective action problems and self-defeating behaviors only holds normative weight under specific assumptions about what generates reasons to act. Where these assumptions do not apply, inefficacy alone offers little guidance. This leads to a dilemma: either inefficacy is normatively exhaustive, and non-transferrable solutions are irrelevant, or these solutions do address real problems, and inefficacy is not a particularly insightful label. The analysis has broader implications for determining what factors make two problems relevantly alike in a way that helps our normative theorizing.
[Title redacted] [draft available upon request]
Submitted
This paper argues that theories of instrumental rationality are ill-equipped to deliver insights on a specific instantiation of vague ends.
This paper aims to show that the chaining argument offered by Ruth Chang to support the existence of parity is of no help in adjudicating the truth or falsity of the Trichotomy Thesis.
How Pre-commitment Limits Autonomy [draft available upon request]
This article suggests that, contrary to what is comonly held, pre-commitment limits the autonomy of the weak-willed indivdual in an important way
This paper offers a theory of acting against the odds, distinguishing it from believing against the odds.
Intertemporal Choice, Planning & Self Control (with Conrad Heilmann)
Chapter in preparation for the edited volume Comprehensive Philosophy of Science (Elsevier)
This chapter surveys and compares the main theories of intertemporal decision-making, as studied by social scientists and philosophers.
Do we Owe Ourselves to Act against the Odds?
I aim to provide an analysis of the morality of acting against the odds through the lens of duties to the self. I argue that whether a person should act against the odds depends on the balance of duties of self-compassion and self-care. A person’s duties of self-care often speak against acting against the odds, when somebody could attain the same prudentially valuable outcome in an easier manner. A person’s duties of self-respect, instead, favour acting against the odds because of the deep link between performing difficult actions and respect for one’s worth. I advance the thesis that, because performing difficult actions is an excellent exercise of the will, intending to perform these actions displays respect towards one's worth as a rational agent. If my argument is correct, it adds an important layer to the moral analysis of acting against the odds, and it has downstream effects for neighbouring discussion in epistemology and consequentialism.
If you Vote Green, How Come you Still Fly? In Defence of Apparent Hypocrisy
I argue that being committed to a societal goal does not require one to perform an individual action that is causally inefficacious (or morally negligible) in the absence of relevant institutions (i.e., policies or social norms) that coordinate the performance of the action. While commitment does not generate the requirement to perform causally inefficacious actions in the absence of coordination, it does generate the requirement to do so when such coordination is in place. This article aims to i) defend this apparent inconsistency and ii) argue against the view that integrity or instrumental rationality requires acting on one's commitments or values in the case of collective action problems (without explicit coordination).
2025. Philosophy Departments as Sites of Collective Intellectual Activities: a Decline? (guest post on Daily Nous) (with Kritika Maheshwari)
Kritika and I wrote a follow-up piece: Philosophy Departments as Sites of Collective Intellectual Activities: A Follow-Up to the Poll.
2020. Does Mandatory Mask-Wearing Restrict Individual freedom? Public Ethics
2024. Special Issue on Intra- and Interpersonal Dilemmas in Ethics and Rational Choice. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 17(1). (With Benjamin Mullins)
2024. The Challenge of Choosing Well. An interview with Chrisoula Andreou. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 17(1). (with Tessa Supèr).
2022. The Philosophy and Economics of Measuring Discrimination and Inequality. A Roundtable discussion with Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Xavier Ramos, and Dirk Van de gaer. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 15(1). (with Lennart Ackermans).
2021. Grounding Equal Freedom. An Interview with Ian Carter. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 14(2).
2019. Review of Ivan Moscati’s Measuring Utility: From the Marginal Revolution to Behavioral Economics. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 13(1): 93-101. (with Enrico Mattia Salonia)